The formation of mature large rRNAs from larger primary transcripts is very different in bacterial and mammalian cells. In both, cotranscription can help to assure the coordinated production of various rRNA species. However, in bacteria, processing is ordered, initiated by cleavages at double‐stranded stems which enclose the mature sequences; several cleavages are required to produce each mature terminus; and the final steps occur in polysomes, apparently linked to continued protein synthesis. In mouse cells, in contrast, cleavages generate nearly all mature (...) termini stochastically and directly, with no evidence for double‐stranded stems as cleavage signals; and processing occurs in the nucleolus, long before any new rRNA chains arrive in polysomes. Spacer sequences also serve different potnetial functions at the evolutionary extremes. In bacteria, transcribed spacer sequences are associated with different secondary structures in the pre‐rRNA compared to the mature rRNA, and these may promote ribosome formation. In mammalian cells, analyses are too premature to assign any comparable function to transcribed spacer sequences, but the non‐transcribed spacers are probably critical in the organization and replication of nucleoli, functions that are absent from bacteria. (shrink)

R.I.G Hughes offers the first detailed and accessible analysis of the Hilbert-space models used in quantum theory and explains why they are so successful.

Group size is a function of relative neocortical volume in nonhuman primates. Extrapolation from this regression equation yields a predicted group size for modern humans very similar to that of certain hunter-gatherer and traditional horticulturalist societies. Groups of similar size are also found in other large-scale forms of contemporary and historical society. Among primates, the cohesion of groups is maintained by social grooming; the time devoted to social grooming is linearly related to group size among the Old World monkeys and (...) apes. To maintain the stability of the large groups characteristic of humans by grooming alone would place intolerable demands on time budgets. It is suggested that (1) the evolution of large groups in the human lineage depended on the development of a more efficient method for time-sharing the processes of social bonding and that (2) language uniquely fulfills this requirement. Data on the size of conversational and other small interacting groups of humans are in line with the predictions for the relative efficiency of conversation compared to grooming as a bonding process. Analysis of a sample of human conversations shows that about 60% of time is spent gossiping about relationships and personal experiences. It is suggested that language evolved to allow individuals to learn about the behavioural characteristics of other group members more rapidly than is possible by direct observation alone. (shrink)

It is shown that a formula of modal propositional logic has precisely the same models as a sentence of the first-order language of a single dyadic predicate iff its class of models is closed under ultraproducts. as a corollary, any modal formula definable by a set of first-order conditions is always definable by a single such condition. these results are then used to show that the formula (lmp 'validates' mlp) is not first-order definable.

Act Utilitarianism has traditionally been regarded as the view that you should always perform the action that will bring about the greatest possible excess of happiness over unhappiness or, if there is no such alternative, the least possible excess of unhappiness over happiness.1 Following Rawls, I shall call this the classical principle. An alternative which Rawls calls the average principle is the view that you should always do the thing that will bring about the highest possible average happiness level. Rawls, (...) Rescher and Broad2 regard the average principle as superior to the classical principle, and there are considerable grounds for supposing that Mill accepted the average principle.3 Smart favours the classical position but confesses that if someone doesn't feel the same way, he doesn't know how to argue with him.4. (shrink)